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This paper asks whether comprehensive, non-interest government size has an inverted U-
shaped effect on private economic output in Canada and whether its current size is too large 
relative to the estimated tipping point. Using data from 1929 through 2011 and controlling for 
both correlations arising among the independent variables across time and endogeneity in the 
relationship between size and performance, we find evidence consistent with size producing an 
inverted U-shaped effect on private output that peaks in the range of 30 to 34 percent of GDP.  
Use of graphic nonparametric methods, conditional on the same control and instrument 
variables, reinforces the parametric estimates of threshold and quadratic models while 
illustrating visually the effect of controlling for endogeneity through instrumented variables. 
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1. Introduction 
There is an ever growing literature on the many ways that government size interacts with the private 
economy.  Early empirical contributions focused on cross country comparisons and include such classic 
papers as Landau (1983), Kormendi and Maguire (1985), Ram (1986) and Grossman (1987). More recent 
contributions that relate government size and output specifically to Canada include Scully (1989), 
Afxentiou and Serletis, (1991), Chao and Grubel (1998), Petry, Imbeau, Crete and Clavet (2000), Voia and 
Ferris (2013), and Ferris and Voia (2014).1 While much of that literature examines how government size 
responds to income and output—what is called Wagner's Law--the strand of the literature we are 
interested in this paper reverses that causality to ask whether government size is complementary with 
or a substitute for private economic performance.  The primary reason for the latter interest is because 
virtually all developed economies have experienced long periods of growth in the size and scope of 
government so that recent periods of economic contraction have triggered concern that size may be 
excessive, unduly constraining private economic performance.  In part in response to the development 
of endogenous growth theory, the focus of analysis has narrowed to the effect of size on economic 
growth (Barro, 1990; Armey, 1995).  Here the consensus view is that government size has a negative 
effect on growth (at least within developed economies).  For example, Afonso and Furceri (2010, p. 527) 
investigate the effect of government size and its volatility on economic growth in OECD and European 
Union countries and conclude that "both dimensions tend to hamper growth."2 Similarly Bergh and 
Henrekson (2011, p.1) conclude that "most recent studies typically find a negative correlation between 
total government size and economic growth". Finally, Facchini and Melki (2013, p.2) survey sixty 
investigations of the relation between government size and economic outcomes and find that "66.6% of 
the studies find a negative effect from government size while only 8.3% find the opposite effect and 
25.1% are inconclusive." 
While the majority of studies find a negative relationship, the not infrequent finding of insignificant or 
even positive effects for government size has led to a search for reasons for this ambiguity (Ciccone and 
Jarocinski, 2010). Most often researchers have focused on compositional differences in government 
spending/taxation across countries (the type of expenditure or tax matters more than size itself) or the 
possibility that government size has had a nonlinear, inverted U-shaped effect on private output (bigger 
size has a bigger negative effect).  In earlier work we examined the inverted U-shaped effect in relation 
to the size of the federal government in Canada (Ferris and Voia, 2014). This analysis had the advantage 
of using an exceptionally long time series of data--reliable data on aggregate federal government 
expenditures can be found from shortly after Confederation (1870) to the present (2011). It also allowed 
for a natural separation between the long run effect of government size and the shorter run effect of 
the changes in size associated with the second significant activity of federal government—the 
countercyclical use of fiscal policy in relation to the business cycle. The disadvantage of focusing solely 
on federal government size, however, was that it did not account for the possibility that government 
1 A representative finding is given by Chao and Grubel (1998) who, following Scully's methodology, find the optimal 
long run size of government in Canada to be about 34% of GDP. 
2 Afonso and Furceri (2010) find that a 1% increase in government size decreases output growth by .12% for OECD 
countries and .13% for European Union countries. 
                                                          
2 
 
activities may be redistributed among the different levels of government over time.   For this reason we 
re-examine the relationship between government size and private output performance in Canada where 
our expenditure measure of size is now comprehensive, that is, the sum of federal, provincial and 
municipal government spending over the 1929 to 2011 time period.3  A focus on comprehensive 
government size, net of inter-governmental transfers and interest payments, has the additional 
advantage of producing a perhaps more appropriate definition of purely private economic activity 
(measured as GDP – aggregate government spending). 
In the following section we begin our analysis by asking what measures of private performance can be 
related meaningfully to government size over the long run.  Here time series considerations suggest that 
it is the level rather than growth rate of economic performance that should be related to government 
size.  We follow this empirical start by presenting a survey of the public choice theory that suggests that 
the form of this interrelationship should be nonlinear, perhaps featuring a tipping point.  After 
controlling for a number of other determinants of private performance, we explore the empirical 
question of which parametric shape best describes the empirical relationship arising between size and 
performance.   Making adjustments for correlations arising among the covariates across time and 
particularly for the likelihood that endogeneity arises between government size and private output, we 
find both threshold and quadratic models of the relationship perform well, producing measures of a 
tipping point that are broadly consistent.  Differences in the implied shape of the function surrounding 
the tipping point and the size of the confidence interval led us to adopt nonparametric modeling 
methods that do not require a discontinuity in the relationship nor symmetry about the tipping point.  
Our nonparametric method uses the spline-based method developed by Ma, Racine and Yang (2011), 
Nie and Racine (2012) and Ma and Racine (2013) to describe the form of the relationships arising in the 
data. They allow the unconstrained patterns of response to different control variables to be illustrated in 
a convenient graphical way and in a form that allows for the incorporation of endogenous regressors 
through the generation of instrumental variable (IV) nonparametric plots. The enhancement of the 
analysis of the tipping point by surrounding the point estimate with an appropriate confidence interval 
allows assessment of whether or not the peak estimates generated by the threshold and quadratic 
models are meaningful and thus relevant for policy analysis. Because time series issues are not as 
serious a concern under the nonparametric approach, the ability to control for endogeneity in the size-
performance relationship and reveal the inverted U-shaped relationship makes outcomes found with 
the parametric analysis more convincing.  The graphs of the nonparametric analysis illustrate visually the 
conditional effect of the interdependent variables and how controlling for endogeneity brings out more 
precisely the inverted U-shaped effect of government size on private performance. 
2. Time series and endogeneity concerns with government size and economic performance 
The time series issue posed by the long run relationship between government size and private economic 
performance can be seen in the following set of diagrams.  In Figure 1 below we show government size, 
3 The starting date, 1929, was chosen as the earliest date for which a comprehensive measure of government size 
was available (see Ferris and Winer, 2007). The ending date is, at the time of writing, the latest for which reliable 
information could be obtained for our entire set of variables. 
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measured as the logarithm of the ratio of aggregate non-interest government expenditure to GNP 
(lnGshare), in relation to two alternative measures of private economic performance.  First, private 
performance is measured as the logarithm of private output per capita (lnPYPC), and second, 
performance is measured as the rate of growth of private output per capita (PCGROWTH).4  As can be 
seen from the second diagram in Figure 1, lnPYPC rises more or less continuously following the Great 
Depression in Canada whereas in the bottom diagram, PCGROWTH, does not increase, varying more or 
less randomly about a constant mean of 1.48% per year.  In econometric terms, the level of private 
economic activity is non-stationary or integrated of order one, I(1), while its rate of growth is stationary 
or integrated of order zero, I(0).5 When we look to the top diagram to examine long run government 
size, lnGshare, it is apparent that abstracting from the spike associated with WW2 expenditures, 
aggregate government size has increased continuously since 1929. Beginning from the low level of 11.8 
percent of GDP in 1929, aggregate government size increased to over 45 percent of GDP by the early 
1990’s, before falling back to 36 percent of GDP in the period just before the recent recession. In 
econometric terms, lnGshare is I(1) or non-stationary. 6  
-- insert Figure 1 about here -- 
The significance of the time series issue highlighted above is that when variables of different order are 
regressed together, the resulting coefficient estimates are often interpreted erroneously.  For example, 
the finding that there exists no relationship between the stochastically growing level of government size 
and a stationary performance growth rate may lead to the premature rejection of the possibility that a 
meaningful relationship could arise between the two levels.  On the other hand, finding that 
nonstationary variables simply trend together through time is often misinterpreted as implying 
causality. Finally, a relationship arising between stationary growth variables is often misinterpreted as 
implying a permanent rather than transient or purely short run relationship arising between levels.7 This 
suggests that when putting together long time series in a hypothesis test, one should regress together 
variables of the same order of integration and, if relating I(1) variables, look for evidence of 
cointegration among these variables.  In our case we begin by exploring the reasoning that would link 
together the two I(1) variables: government size and the level of private output per capita.8 
4 Private output is defined as GDP minus aggregate non-interest government expenditures net of 
intergovernmental transfers. 
5 The order of integration refers to the number of times a time series must be differenced before finding 
stationarity. The adjusted Dickey Fuller (ADF) test statistic for lnPYPC is -0.312 (constant) and -6.13 (constant) for 
PCGROWTH. The corresponding MacKinnon 1% critical value of -3.51 allows rejection of the hypothesis that the 
growth rate is nonstationary. 
6 The ADF test statistics for lnGshare are -2.19 (constant) and -3.17 (constant and trend), with the latter only 
marginally smaller than the weakest Mackinnon critical value of -3.16 (for 10%). The ADF statistic for its first 
difference is -6.13 (constant) considerably smaller than the corresponding MacKinnon 1% critical value of -3.52. 
7 That is, it implies a permanent relationship between the changes in levels, where the changes in both levels are 
stationary and hence transitory about their long run values. 
8 While the analysis could begin by linking first differences, doing so loses any information arising from a 
relationship existing between the two levels. In our case, because the business cycle is stationary over time 
transitory changes in government size that reflect purely countercyclical intervention (or automatic cyclical 
response) may dominate the fewer permanent changes in government size that are of interest to this analysis. 
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The second significant econometric issue to be faced is endogeneity. That is, while cointegration does 
provide evidence of a long run equilibrium relationship, it says nothing about directional causality. 
Moreover, while our interest is on how government size affects private output, the literature 
investigating Wagner's Law argues that the level of government size can be explained by the scale and 
complexity of the private economy.  It follows that the ability to interpret the correlation between 
government size and per capita output as a measure of government’s effect on private output is 
problematic.  To be more precise about any one of these causal routes, the analysis must control for the 
feedback that can come from induced changes to the other side.  This we discuss at length in Section 4 
below.  But before turning to these empirical issues, we motivate the hypothesis of an inverted U-
shaped of the effect of government size on private economic performance from public choice theory. 
3. Public choice and the effect of federal government size on the private economy 
Broadly speaking public choice analysis views increases in government size as producing two opposing 
effects on the output of the private sector. First in terms of size generating benefits, initial levels of 
government spending are viewed as providing basic levels of security that keep individuals safe from 
physical threat (through collective policing, national defense and diplomatic services) and their property 
rights secure from arbitrary seizure (through the administration of justice as codified in criminal and 
commercial law). Further expansion of these roles allow higher levels and better qualities of policing and 
legal services that in turn permit individuals greater predictability in their dealing with strangers thus 
realize larger levels of production, trade and welfare (Coase, 1960; Becker, 1983; Wittman, 1995). To the 
extent that communal services such as health, sanitation, social welfare, education, and research and 
development are provided by government revenues, larger levels of government spending can increase 
the quality of productive inputs and through this the output of the private sector (Dahlman, 1991; 
Thomson and Jensen, 2013). Even more directly, the government provision and monitoring of 
transportation infrastructure provides inputs that complement private capital and enhance private 
output (Karras, 1997; Sturm, Kuper and de Haan, 1998). It follows that if government expands by 
adopting projects in order of their social merit, the social marginal product of government's involvement 
in the private economy would begin positively and then fall as government size increases.  This is 
illustrated as the concave curve in upper diagram of Figure 2.  
insert Figure 2 about here 
The opposing channel of influence focuses on the cost of government intervention. The necessity of 
funding government activity means that as government size grows, larger levels of resources must be 
obtained from the private sector.  This loss reduces directly the private consumption possibilities of the 
private sector.  In addition, however, the acquisition of these resources through taxation—through both 
higher levels and often differential rates—further decreases private output by discouraging the supply 
of productive inputs and distorting the cost of private provision (Stuart, 1984; Usher, 1986). Thus as the 
size of government grows, the tax price of government services increases. This has led writers such as 
Hence by initially looking for cointegration among levels we get a cleaner measure of the long run relationships 
(with the cyclical effects remaining in the residuals). See Ferris (2014) for an expansion of this idea in relation to 
government size in New Zealand. 
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Grossman (1987), Scully (1989, 2000), Armey (1995) and Facchini and Melki (2013) to argue that on net, 
larger government size must eventually encounter diminishing returns that at some point may reach the 
point where further increases in size reduce rather than increase private output.9 The increasing cost of 
government size on private per capita output is illustrated as the upward sloping curve in the upper 
diagram of Figure 2.  Finally the hypothesized net effect of government size and the level of size that 
maximizes per capita private output (referred to in the literature as the tipping point) is illustrated in the 
second diagram of Figure 2.  Posed as a regression equation, this can be tested for empirically (if the 
nonlinear effect is assumed to be quadratic) as 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 =  𝑐𝑐0 +  𝑐𝑐1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 +  𝑐𝑐2(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡)2 +  𝑐𝑐3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡   (1) 
where the analysis predicts that 𝑐𝑐1 > 0, 𝑐𝑐2 < 0 and 𝜏𝜏 = exp (− 𝑐𝑐22𝑐𝑐1) is the estimate of the tipping point 
shown in Figure 2. In (1) 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 is a random error. 
Ideally we would like to include as controls factors of production such as the capital to labour ratio and 
measures of human capital.  However in Canada good estimates of the aggregate capital stock exist only 
as far back as 1955 and aggregate education variables (as provincial in responsibility) are similarly 
lacking over the long run.  Hence long run studies of output levels in Canada have used what data is 
available as proxies for these variables (see, for example, Winer and Ferris, 2008).  In our analysis we use 
four control variables including: LnAgric, where Agric is the share of the labour force in agriculture (to 
capture changes in the composition of industrial output and urbanization across time); Lnimratio, where 
Imratio measures immigration relative to population size (particularly important in the pre-depression 
and post-world war two time periods); LnYoung, where Young is the proportion of the population 
sixteen and below (to capture changing demographics); and LnUSiip, where USiip is the U. S. index of 
industrial production. The very close integration of the Canadian and US economies means that the US 
index of industrial production will capture common improvements in productivity and performance 
arising across the two countries. As importantly, the small size of the Canadian economy relative to the 
US means that we can treat LnUSiip as exogenous to the performance of the Canadian economy. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these variables together with LnPYPC, LnGshare and 
LnGshare_sq and the Data Appendix provides more detail on their sources. The key point to be noted is 
that all variables except for one of the political variables (to be introduced later) are I(1). 
4. Testing for the linear effect of government size on output versus a threshold effect  
We begin our search for the effect of government size on private output per capita by first asking 
whether there is evidence that the relationship arising among the two potentially endogenous variables 
and the control variables is strictly linear.  That is finding that the linear version of equation (1) is 
cointegrated would provide strong evidence of a linear long run equilibrium relationship that would 
negate the need to search further for nonlinearity.  The test for the presence of a such a long run linear 
9 Theories directed at explaining why government size may become too large include Niskanen's (1968) theory of 
the bureau, Meltzer and Richard's (1981) median voter theory, Brennen and Buchanan’s (1980) Leviathan model 
and Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) emphasis of the common pool problems that arise in modern democracies. 
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relationship requires evidence of the stationarity of the residuals of an OLS regression of equation (1) 
with 𝑐𝑐2 = 0.  The results of this test are presented as column (1) in Table 2.   
-- insert Table 2 about here – 
While an initial view of column (1) suggests that there is a long run negative relationship between the 
logarithms of government size and private output, the large value of the R2 term (.993) and the low size 
of the Durbin-Watson statistic (0.869) provide the classic sign that the estimated relationship may be 
spurious.  As is well known, such a conclusion can be rejected if the residuals of the OLS equation are 
stationary.  In our case, however, the Engle-Granger test for stationarity among the residuals provides 
only weak evidence of cointegration—that is, the Adjusted Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistic (-4.78) 
allows us to reject the hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals only at the ten percent level.  Similarly 
the inverse Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic for stationarity in the residuals (0.057) falls 
well below the ten percent critical value (0.347) for stationarity.  Neither test generates confidence in 
the hypothesis that there is a long run (linear) equilibrium relationship between government size and 
private performance. 
The relatively weak evidence of linearity led us to question whether a threshold model might, as Hansen 
(2000, 575) suggests, “yield parsimonious evidence of an underlying nonlinearity”.  In our case we look 
for evidence of a downward kink in the slope of an otherwise linear relationship arising between size 
and performance.   More explicitly, then, we test whether Bruce Hansen’s threshold model (2000) 
allows for a better representation of the data.  In columns (2a) and (2b) we present the results of this 
test in the form of the two estimated equations and the estimated breakpoint.  The data does suggest a 
downward shift in the estimate of the government size coefficient (from -.130 to -.965) around 1980, 
where the kink in the otherwise linear relationship takes place at a government size of roughly 37 
percent of GDP.10 The accompanying test of the hypothesis of no threshold against the alternative of 
having a threshold (allowing for White corrected heteroskedastic errors and 5000 bootstrap 
replications) yields a P-value of .0006. 
While the threshold model does provide evidence of a non-linearity in the relationship between 
government size and private per capita output, the coefficient estimates are likely to include the effects 
of endogeneity.  Therefore we correct for the presence of Wagner Law type endogeneity running from 
private output to government size by using a set of variables that affect private per capita output only 
through their effect on government size.  An OLS regression of these variables on government size is 
then used to generate a prediction for government size that will be independent of feedback. Thus 
replacing the actual with the predicted value of government size in the threshold model allows us to 
derive a new set of estimated size effects that are less likely to incorporate this form of endogeneity.  
The instruments used as explanatory variables include three purely political determinants of 
government size: the proportion of the population that is registered to vote; the proportion of 
registered voters who actually voted in federal elections (with larger voting participation—a bigger 
10 Note that the results suggest that immigration played a significant positive role in relation to private output per 
capita only in the earlier, pre-1980 time period.  The immigration rate has had no significant effect on output in the 
most recent time period.  
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franchise and larger turnout expected to increase government size); and the degree of political 
competition (measured as the average size of the winning margin in federal constituencies and expected 
to decrease government size).  We also followed Rodrik (1998) in including the increasing openness of 
trade as a metric that could explain the growth of government size in Canada.11    
The results are shown as columns (3a) and (3b) of Table 2.  Three things are of particular interest.  First, 
the coefficient estimates of government size now indicate a peak rather than just a kink in the effect of 
government size at the threshold point.  The result is then consistent with the hypothesis of government 
size exerting an inverted V shaped effect on private performance.  Second, the estimated tipping point 
in the threshold model of column (3a and b) is smaller than that estimated in column (2a and b).  This 
implies that the correction for endogeneity has lowered the estimate of the level at which government 
size begins to reduce private per capita output.  Third while the correction for endogeneity has had little 
effect on the size of the coefficient estimates of LnAgric and LnUSiip, the separation into two distinct 
time periods does bring out more distinctly a change in the estimated effect of immigration and youth 
on private per capita output.  In the period between 1929 and 1985 a higher immigration rate and a 
lower proportion of the population 16 or younger is associated with higher private per capita output.  In 
the later 1985 to 2011 time period, however, the opposite holds true.  Finally, the accompanying test of 
the hypothesis that there is no threshold against the alternative of having a threshold (allowing for 
White corrected heteroskedastic errors and 5000 bootstrap replications) yields a P-value of .0096.  This 
implies that the threshold model presents a better fit with the data than does the simple linear version 
of column (1). 
5.  From a Linear to a Quadratic effect of Government Size on Per Capita Private Output 
The improvement of the threshold model over the linear model allows for the possibility that further 
insight can be gained by loosening the form of the constraint on the nonlinear relationship.  This leads 
us in Table 3 to present three sets of estimates of the hypothesized quadratic form discussed earlier as 
equation (1).  Here the progression of the three tests from column (1) through column (3) corresponds 
to corrections made to account first for correlations arising among the independent variables across 
time and then for endogeneity in the relationship between government size and private performance.   
-- insert Table 3 about here -- 
The fact that the standard errors of the coefficient estimates in (1) are likely biased by correlations 
arising among the independent variables across time leads to the correction embodied in dynamic 
ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimation.  In column (2) we present these DOLS results.  The results here 
reinforce the significance of the inverted U-shaped form suggested by column (1) and imply an increase 
in both the curvature of the hypothesized quadratic relationship and the estimate of the size of the 
tipping point (from 11.5 to 21 percent).  As was the case in the threshold model estimated earlier, the 
inverted U-shaped relationship now indicated by the coefficient signs is consistent with a long run 
11 Openness is defined as the ratio of exports plus imports divided by GDP. As the estimated equation in the 
footnote to Table 2 indicates, greater openness is associated with a larger sized government as predicted by Rodrik 
(1998). The positive correlation estimated, however, is not strongly significant.  
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equilibrium relationship, but not necessarily with causality running from government size to per capita 
private output.  In column (3) we then present the results that correct simultaneously for both the 
presence of intertemporal correlations and the likelihood of endogeneity.  This is done by retaining the 
DOLS formulation and then instrumenting government size.  In controlling for endogeneity—the 
feedback from greater private performance to a larger sized government—we use the same instruments 
for government size as before: the set of political determinants of government size and the degree of 
openness to foreign trade.   
What is apparent from the results in column (3) is that instrumenting LnGshare and LnGshare_sq does 
succeed in removing much of the endogeneity—the probability that endogeneity remains in the 
regression estimates is now only 0.008. As was the case for the threshold model, the coefficient 
correction increases the curvature of the function relating government size to private output per capita 
but unlike the threshold case, results in an estimate of the tipping point that is higher.  The adjusted 
quadratic model now implies a peak in private output per capita when government size is roughly 32 
percent of GDP and value much closer to the tipping point estimated earlier for the instrumented 
threshold model.12  In terms of the control variables, LnUSiip is an exception in that all other control 
variables retain their sign and significance with the absolute size of their estimated effect tending to 
rise.    
6.  Confidence Intervals and Nonparametric Estimation 
If we think of the results in column (3) of Tables 2 and 3 as the versions of the threshold and quadratic 
models that best capture the effect of government size on private per capita output, can we say 
anything about whether the implied tipping points in these models are consistent with each other?  One 
way of making this assessment is to see if the point estimate of one tipping point lies within the 
confidence interval of the other point estimate.  To do so we use the Delta method (see Oehlert 1992) 
to establish Wald-type confidence intervals about the tipping point for the quadratic case in Table 3. 
After adopting a 95% confidence criterion, Delta lower and upper bounds can be established around the 
31.8 percent point estimate of the tipping point in the quadratic case as, respectively, 28.6 and 34.9 
percent.13 This then encompasses point estimate of the tipping point in the threshold model of 34.5 
percent.  In this sense the alternative parametric estimates are consistent. 
 
While the estimates of the two parametric models are not dissimilar, the parametric representations of 
threshold and the quadratic models impose relatively strong restrictions on the possible shapes of the 
underlying functional relationship to be estimated.  The threshold model, for example, allows the effect 
of government size on private output to differ on either side of the tipping point but allows only a single 
discontinuity in the linear slope of that relationship.  The quadratic form, on the other hand, allows for 
more continuous variation in the size of the estimated effect but imposes symmetry on either side of 
the tipping point.  Both restrictions are likely to misidentify the tipping point should the underlying 
relationship not exhibit either convenient feature.    
12 See the following section for a more detailed comparison. 
13 For details on this process see Ferris and Voia (2014, Appendix B).  
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To assess whether either parametric form may result in a misidentification of the tipping point we adopt 
the nonparametric spline-based method of Ma, Racine and Yang (2011), Nie and Racine (2012) and Ma 
and Racine (2013). In doing so we assume that the conditional mean of LNPYPC depends on government 
size, the controls adopted earlier, and follows a non-linear, unknown function approximated by the 
best-fit B-splines that allows for heteroskedasticity of an unknown form. That is, we assume  
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 =  𝑓𝑓(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) + 𝜎𝜎(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡)𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡    (2) 
 
where 𝜎𝜎 and 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 are unknown and estimation is conducted assuming exogenous and then possibly 
endogenous covariates.  Readers interested in a more technical description of the method used and the 
generation of the graphical representations of the fitted function and the partial effects associated with 
each covariate are referred to Ferris and Voia (2014, Appendix C).  It also details the derivation of the 
point-wise confidence bands.  To control for endogeneity, we estimate a nonparametric instrumental 
variables model following a regression spline methodology developed by Horowitz (2011) where the 
instruments used are the same as those used in the earlier parametric regressions. Once again readers 
interested in the technical details are referred to Ferris and Voia (2014, Appendix D). 
 
--Figures 3 and 4 about here -- 
 
The results of using these nonparametric methods are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, where the 
difference between these two sets of figures arises because of instrumenting government size for 
endogeneity.  What the nonparametric results make more apparent visually is how controlling for the 
feedback from private output to government size brings out the inverted U-shaped effect of 
government size on private per capita output.  This is particularly important since the nonparametric 
method is less susceptible to misspecification by time series issues.  Thus the graphic method illustrates 
how the flatness of the estimated effect of government size in the neighborhood surrounding the 
estimated tipping point and its asymmetric shape can result in the varied estimates of the tipping point 
found by the threshold and quadratic models.  However by calculating the derivatives of the functions 
estimated in Figure 4 and solving for the log-value of government size at which its derivative becomes 
zero, we can more precisely determine the log-value of the tipping point.  This is found as 3.4, a log-
value that corresponds to an actual government size of 29.5 percent.14  The upper and lower bounds of 
the 95 percent confidence interval can also be determined and established, respectively, as 31.7 and 
27.2 percent.15  Hence although the earlier parametric estimates and their confidence intervals suggest 
that the effect of government size could peak somewhere in the 27 to 35 percent range, the 
nonparametric method finds that the quadratic form does a better job than does the threshold model in 
capturing not only the shape of the underlying function in the neighborhood of the tipping point but 
also the location of its peak.  As a bonus the nonparametric control diagrams in Figure 4 also illustrate 
14 The diagrams in Figure 4b show the slope of the corresponding functions in Figure 4a. Use of the first derivative 
allows for a more precise determination of the tipping point as a function of government size (variable z in the first 
diagrams) when the function itself is very flat in the neighborhood of its peak.    
15 These calculations and diagrams are available on request. 
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why the coefficient signs on lnimratio and lnyoung depend on the time interval (via their growing size) 
over which the separate parts of the threshold model is estimated.   In this sense the nonparametric 
methods bring together in one set of diagrams the separate aspects of the relationship appearing earlier 
in the different parametrically estimated models.   
 
7.  Policy Significance 
 
If we use the above analyses and its conclusion that government size peaks in its positive effect on 
private per capita output at closer to 32 than to 35 percent of GDP, then this criterion implies that 
government size is currently too large in Canada.  Inspection of Figure 5 shows that the expenditure 
share of consolidated government in GDP has exceeded forty percent in each of the last three years of 
our sample.  On the other hand, some portion of both provincial and federal government spending in 
these years will reflect higher than normal levels of expenditure arising in response to the 2008/9 
recession.  In that sense, some portion of the more recent increase in government size will be purely 
transitory.  Hence if we use the pre-recession period instead as the guideline for what has been the 
current normal size of government, consolidated government has somewhat smaller, averaging 36.6 
percent over the 2000 to 2006 time period.  Using this metric, actual government size has been 4.6 
percentage points or 15 percent higher than the output maximizing size of government.  It follows that if 
the policy objective of the community were to maximize the effect of government size on private per 
capita output, this analysis suggests that government size should be smaller.  As we have seen, however, 
the function describing the effect of government size on private per capita output is virtually flat over 
the 30 to 35 percent range.  This suggests that the loss in foregone private output per capita has been 
relatively marginal. 
 
It is also important recognize that while the government’s ability to enhance the output performance of 
the private sector is a commendable objective, it is not the only objective of government.  Indeed the 
variation in government size that takes place over the business cycle is a clear indication that counter 
cyclical spending, particularly in times of recession is a valued activity of government.  Somewhat more 
generally, government performs a number of redistributive functions that imply a willingness to accept 
the need to sacrifice some amount of efficiency for greater equity.  Hence if one admits a legitimate 
redistributive role for government, the optimal size of government size would be expected to be 
somewhat larger than the level that would maximize private output performance. 
 
-- Figure 5 about here -- 
 
Finally while we have focused on aggregate government size, it may be of interest to ask whether 
expenditure levels have risen equally across the different levels of government or were concentrated at 
one level of government. This comparison can be seen in Figure 5 where we plot both non-interest 
federal and consolidated government spending as a percentage of GDP.  As that figure indicates, while 
both curves rose through 1974/5, the distance between the two curves gradually widened, reflecting 
the growth in provincial and local government expenditure relative to the federal government.  In the 
period following 1975, aggregate government size itself did not increase, varying both above and below 
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40 percent. However, in terms of its subcomponents federal government size slowly fell from 20 percent 
to 14 percent of GDP implying that provincial and local government size increased both relative to the 
federal government and in absolute size (from 18 to 27 percent).  In part this reflects the growth in the 
importance of health and education expenditures which are both areas of provincial responsibility.   
 
From this it is tempting to argue that if a smaller sized government is desired, the relative growth of 
provincial and local government spending would place the onus of adjustment on the provinces rather 
than the federal government.  However, such a conclusion is well beyond the scope of this paper and 
would require a much more intensive analysis of the evolving roles of government within the Canadian 
federation (see also Kneebone, 1992).  Moreover a point of caution is suggested by the findings of our 
earlier analysis of federal government size (Ferris and Voia, 2014). That is, even though federal 
government size has been falling, that analysis did suggest that federal government size was 
proportionally higher than its output maximizing level than consolidated government size was found to 
be here. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we test the hypothesis that aggregate government size in Canada has exerted an inverted 
U shaped effect on private output per capita and find evidence consistent with that hypothesis.  No 
matter whether the form of that relationship is viewed as linear with a kink (as in the threshold analysis) 
or as a more smoothly symmetric function (as in the quadratic model), our parametric estimates suggest 
a peaking in the positive effect of government size in the range of between 27 and 35 percent of GDP.  
Our use of nonparametric methods to assess the robustness of these restricted forms reinforces the 
parametric findings generally but does suggest that the output maximizing size of government will lie 
closer to the 32 percent level found using the quadratic form.  The graphical techniques of the 
nonparametric method also illustrated diagrammatically the importance of controlling for endogeneity 
and its role in reconciling the findings across the three major methods used for estimation. 
 
In terms of its policy significance, the results are broadly reassuring in their implication that current 
aggregate government size in Canada is not particularly excessive.  That is, while the current ‘normal’ 
size of Canada’s consolidated government is somewhat larger than the estimated tipping point, the gap 
between the quadratic estimated peak and the actual is relatively small (only 4.6 percentage points 
above the quadratic estimate of 32 percent) with the marginally negative effect of larger size is 
estimated to be small in the neighborhood of the tipping point.  Moreover it is not clear that maximizing 
private output per capita is the sole or even overriding objective of government policy.  When one takes 
into account the collective desire by the community to use government to improve equity through 
redistributive programs, the implied efficiency cost means that the optimal size of government will be 
somewhat above the tipping point of our analysis.  On the other hand, what the analysis does say 
forcefully is that government size does have a cost in terms of foregone private output.  Given the scale 
of current government size in Canada the analysis suggests that there is no free lunch associated with 
the further expansion of government size.  As with all other economic choices, the operative question 
for government is always whether the proposed lunch is worth its cost.      
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Data Appendix:  Economic and Political Variables 
Economic Variables: 
AGRIC = percentage of the labour force in agriculture: 1929-1975, Cansim D31251/D31252; 1975-2011, 
Cansim II v2710106/v2710104. 
EXPORTS and IMPORTS = 1929-1960, Leacy (1983), Series G383, 384; 1960-1995, CANSIM series D14833 
& D14836; 1996-2011,  CANSIM II v647592, Table 380-0027 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product at market prices; 1929-1980 Cansim D11000; 1981-2011; Cansim II 
v3862688. 
GOV_COMP = consolidate non-interest government expenditure =GCI + GTR + GSUB   
GCI = Federal + Provincial + Municipal consumption and investment: 1929-1960, Statistics Canada, 
National Income and Expenditure Accounts Annual Estimates, 1926-1986 13- 531 Table 54; 1961-2011 
Cansim II sum of v647239 + v647222 + v647285 + v647299 + v647257 + v647272 Table 3800022. 
GTR = Total government transfers to persons: 1929-1960: Statistics Canada, National Income and 
Expenditure Accounts Annual Estimates, 1926 - 1986 13-531 Table 55. Government Transfer Payments 
to Persons, CANSIM matrix No. 006682; 1961 - 2011: CANSIM II Series Number: V647180. 
GSUB = Total Subsidies (Total Provincial + Total Federal + Total Local) subsidies to Business; 1929-1960: 
Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Accounts Annual Estimates, 1926 – 1986 13 - 531 
Table 56.Subsidies, CANSIM matrix No. 006683; 1961 - 2011: CANSIM II v647181. 
Gshare = GOV_COMP/GDP 
Immigration: O.J. Firestone Canada’s Economic Development 1929-1953 Table 83, Population, Families, 
Births, Deaths (in thousands); 1954-1995; Cansim D27; 1996-2011 Cansim II v16. 
IMRATIO = Immigration/POP 
LnX = log(X) 
OPEN = EXPORTS + IMPORTS/GDP 
P = GDP deflator:  1929-1995 (1986=100), Cansim data label D14476; 1996-2011, Cansim D140668. All 
indexes converted to 1986 = 100 basis. 
PYPC = (GDP – GOV_COMP)/(P*POP). 
USiip = US Index of Industrial Production: 1929 – 2011 (INDPRO) Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, G.17 Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, 
Index 2007=100. Note: Average of 12 months. 
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Young = percentage of the population 16/17 and younger;  1929-1970 Cansim C892547; 1971-2011 
Cansim II v466965.  
Political Variables: 
Registered = fraction of the population registered to vote.   Source: Elections Canada web 
site, www.elections.ca/past elections/A History of the Vote in Canada: Appendix 
 Turnout = fraction of registered voters who voted.  Source: Elections Canada web 
site, www.elections.ca/past elections/A History of the Vote in Canada: Appendix 
Winningmargin = the percentage of the votes won the winning party minus the percentage won by its 
closest rival multiplied by 1/election distance {where election distance is the number of years from the 
closest election}. Source:  Electoral results by Party, 1867 to Date. Web site of the Parliament of 
Canada: www.parl.gc.ca. 
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Figure 1: The logarithms of Government Size, Private Output per capita and the Growth Rate
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics: Canada 1929 - 2011 
Variable name Mean Maximum Minimum 
Standard 
Deviation 
ADF Statistic 
-- level 
(constant) 
ADF Statistic   
1st difference 
(constant) 
LnPYPC 9.01 9.73 7.99 0.480 -0.312 -6.13*** 
LnGshare 3.40 3.83 2.47 0.335 -2.19 -6.30*** 
(LnGshare)2 11.70 14.67 6.09 2.19 -2.11 -6.46*** 
LnAgric 2.04 3.59 0.545 1.00 -0.198 -6.58*** 
LnYoung 3.41 3.67 3.00 0.210 -1.34 -1.21 
LnImratio -0.677 0.529 -2.679 0.756 -2.29 -7.27*** 
LnUSiip 8.55 7.74 4.54 0.898 -0.935 -7.40 
LnOpen 3.92 4.45 3.46 0.237 -1.76 -6.76*** 
LnRegistered 4.15 4.32 3.96 0.109 -1.72 -8.62*** 
Lnturnout 4.27 4.37 4.07 0.75 -1.64 -8.85*** 
LnWinningmargin 2.37 3.28 1.54 0.461 -7.53***  
***(**)[*] significantly different from zero at 1% (5%) [10%] using the MacKinnon (1996) critical values 
of -3.51 (-2.90) [-2.59]. 
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Table 2:  The Linear Parametric Effects of Aggregate Government Size on Private 
Output Per Capita: Canada 1929 - 2011  
 
Dependent Variable 
Regression Type 
(1) 
LNPYPC 
OLS  
 
(2a) 
LNPYPC 
Threshold 
q < 3.62 
(2b) 
LNPYPC 
Threshold 
q > 3.62 
(3a) 
LNPYPC 
Threshold 
q < 3.54 
(3b) 
LNPYPC 
Threshold 
q > 3.54  
LnGShare -0.319*** 
(9.26) 
-.0.130** 
(2.73) 
-0.965*** 
(17.9) 
  
Pred_LnGShare# 
 
   0.0445 
(0.796) 
-0.458*** 
(3.40) 
LnAgric -0.114*** 
(4.36) 
-0.045 
(1.33) 
-0.299*** 
(9.76) 
-0.147** 
(2.59) 
-0.227*** 
(3.18)) 
LnImratio 
 
0.018* 
(1.70) 
0.046*** 
(3.92) 
-0.024 
(1.56) 
0.088*** 
(6.84) 
-0.190*** 
(4.13) 
LnYoung -0.178*** 
(3.88) 
-0.374*** 
(10.39) 
-0.269*** 
(4.90) 
-0.232*** 
(4.01) 
0.378** 
(1.94) 
LnUSiip 0.463*** 
(14.62) 
0.437*** 
(10.23) 
0.224*** 
(5.55) 
0.270*** 
(11.78) 
0.697*** 
(6.11) 
Constant 7.39*** 
(36.77) 
7.80*** 
(45.6) 
11.15*** 
(27.06) 
7.56*** 
(29.6) 
3.90*** 
(3.20) 
No. of Observations 
R2 
Durbin-Watson 
(8,83) 
Engle/Granger (ADF) 
Estimated Tipping 
point 
83 
.993 
0.869 
 
-4.78* 
52 
.996 
 
 
 
37.2% 
31 
.995 
 
 
 
37.2% 
56 
.984 
 
 
 
34.5% 
27 
.950 
 
 
 
34.5% 
absolute value of t statistic in brackets; ***(**)[*] significantly different from zero at 1% (5%)[10%] 
# Pred_LnGShare = -9.35 + 1.59***LnRegistered + 0.075LnWinningmargin + 1.08**LnTurnout + 0.336 LnOpen 
with R2 =.399.  The equation passes the link test for model specification in the sense that the prediction value 
squared has no explanatory power. 
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Table 3:  Quadratic estimates of the Effect of Aggregate Government Size on 
Private Output Per Capita: Canada 1929 - 2011  
 
Dependent Variable 
Regression Type 
Parametric Form 
(1) 
LNPYPC 
OLS 
Quadratic 
(2) 
LNPYPC 
DOLSt 
Quadratic 
(3) 
LNPYPC 
2SLS; DOLSt 
Quadratic 
LnGShare 0.830 
(1.74) 
3.09** 
(2.50) 
14.65*** 
(2.69) 
LnGShare_sq -0.172 
(2.40) 
-0.510*** 
(2.91) 
-2.12*** 
(2.79) 
LnAgric -0.121 
(4.19) 
-0.125*** 
(2.80) 
-0.328*** 
(3.49) 
LnImratio 
 
0.025 
(2.04) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
0.159** 
(2.20) 
LnYoung -0.258 
(6.73) 
-0.197** 
(2.02) 
-1.18** 
(2.56) 
LnUSiip 0.429 
(10.70) 
0.442*** 
(5.17) 
-0.360 
(1.01) 
Constant 5.978 
(8.98) 
1.90 
(1.31) 
-5.30*** 
(3.78) 
No. of Observations 
R2 
Durbin-Watson (8,83) 
Engle/Granger (ADF) 
Test of Endogenous 
regressors: P –value 
Estimated Tipping 
point 
83 
.993 
.673 
-4.22 
 
 
 
11.5% 
78 
 
.673 
-5.78 
 
 
 
20.70% 
78 
.994 
 
-7.48 
 
0.008 
 
31.8% 
absolute value of t statistic in brackets; ***(**)[*] significantly different from zero at 1% (5%)[10%] 
t DOLS uses contemporaneous first difference and two leads and lags of first differences together with 
Newey-West adjusted standard errors to account for correlations across among independent variables 
within and across time. 
# 2SLS uses as instruments of government size: lnregistered, lnturnout, lnwinningmargin and LnOpen. 
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Figure 3:  Nonparametric estimates of the conditional effects of Government Size 
and Controls on LNPYPC without instruments for endogeneity 
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Figure 4: Nonparametric estimates of the conditional effects of Government Size 
and Controls on LNPYPC after instrumenting for endogeneity 
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